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03/30/2010

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When (approx. year) did SF (and the Army) go from Guerilla Warfare to Unconventional Warfare? What was the environment of the Army and SF like at the time (conditions)? What variables contributed to the switch (directly or indirectly)?

New question in regards to the definition of UW, and to a greater degree, all DoD/JS/Army definitions:

Can our (US) definition of UW be applied to describe the activities/operations of an enemy/opposing force, state, non-state actor?

Things to consider:
1) Does the underlying US doctrine of UW, the basis of the definition, support a non-US actor's goals, objectives, endstates, etc against the US?
2) Are other definitions within US doctrine more appropriate to label/categorize a non-US actor's activities in an effort to correctly identify that actor's true goals, objectives, etc.?

This question came about during a dicsussion about other countries' actions in supporting terrorist groups. From that discsussion the issue that arose was whether or not when another country, directly or indirectly supporting terrorist organizations whose actions target US persons, locations, etc., are conducting UW against the US.

The argument at the time was no...those countries are not conducting UW unless they meet the screening criteria identified within the definition above. The screening criteria to be met would include:
- operating in a denied environment (US is probably more semi-permissive to these groups as opposed to denied).
- conducting operations through and with an underground, auxillary and guerilla force (a thorough assessment would have to correctly identify, confirm, and articulate this point)
- goal/endstate of coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the government (this point could be argued but again...is another definition more appropriate)
- enabling a resistance or insurgency (one would have to be careful to identify which group meets this threshhold - otherwise, an incorrect analysis could cause analysts/leaders to view those activities/actions inappropriately and employ the wrong measures to counter this type of threat.)

The above, although briefly, should identify to a reader why mission analysis is so important, especially when conducting an intel assessment/analysis.

I know we want a comprehensive, all-encompassing, iron-clad definition of what UW is, but do we not handcuff ourselves each time? Must we have all three elements (underground, auxiliary, and guerrillas) present before it becomes UW? Must UW be conducted in a denied area? What is the specific definition of that? Does it prevent us from conducting UW in areas not denied, such as semi-permissive or areas of ambiguous control? I think Unconventional Warfare, by its very name, potentially encompasses all that is non-conventional (attack, defend, move to contact). Each case where the application of military force is considered, we need to ask, "What do I hope to achieve?" From that, we must ask, "What forces do I have that can reasonably be expected to achieve that goal?" Forgive me the comparison, but I will side with the judge who said, "I may not be able to define pornography, but I know it when I see it."

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