I was watching the show Extreme Makeover: Home Edition the other night and realized that this show is indicative of the US behavior in Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN). If you haven’t seen the show, a family is selected who is having significant problems because of an illness, death, fire, etc. most often resulting in some form of financial crisis that doesn’t allow them to fix their usually small dilapidated home. In comes ABC and Tye Pennington and over a 7 day period, after sending the family on vacation, builds them a usually very large fully landscaped modern home. Now, if the people financially couldn’t afford or physically couldn’t take care of the old small run down home, how can they afford or take care of the new often twice as large house with expensive gadgetry?
Seems we take this same approach to COIN kind of an Extreme Makeover: Country Edition. We pour billions of dollars into a country to try to establish a government and structure that it doesn’t have the ability financially, physically or intellectually to retain and maintain. This is a problem with the IW, SAF, COIN construct as opposed to the FID, COIN doctrine. The IW, SAF, COIN doctrine is based on what the US does. How the US will win. How to achieve the US goals for the government. We have to win the hearts and minds to the US objectives. This does look very much like a form of colonialism. The FID, COIN doctrine is predicated on a whole of government developed and coordinated Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan established by the government we are supporting. It is long term, frustrating, slow work that doesn’t take place in one command or election cycle for that matter.
Your thoughts?
At issue is the government (or lack thereof) in Afghanistan and the US support to it in the pursuit of one of our national interests: security through stability. Other national interests include the export of democracy and the promulgation of human rights. These national interests, as a Rand study suggested, may be working at cross purposes in the short term (five to ten years).
Our unique American culture hinders us here in that we want both democracy and stability and we want them right now. The problem is our culture also blinds us to the fact democracy may not be wanted or even possible in some areas of the world. I think the Middle East in general and Afghanistan in particular is true in this case. This is due to their culture and religion. I disagree the Afghanis lack the intellectual ability to retain and maintain a government. I argue their culture prevents them from having a government like ours. Deep down we are all human, but some people are not like us. They don’t want to be like us. If we try to make them in our image, they will resent us.
If we accept that democracy may not be appropriate in Afghanistan, then we should examine how we intend to foster stability there in the interest of our security. We should place less emphasis on direct military force and more on application of other elements of national power to assist the whatever natural form of government comes to pass there, even if is not democratic. If the government is hostile to us, or worse, becomes a failed state, then maybe our best interests are served in isolating the effects that area can project.
In order to have “success” in Afghanistan, I think we need to dispassionately examine our national interests in order to determine what we can realistically expect to achieve. If we regard colonialism as a means to security, then we ought to quit mincing around and say so. We’ll be in for a long, bloody, expensive haul. If, on the other hand, we mean simply to assist in global security so all can prosper, we need to be more like “Home Improvement” and not “Extreme Makeover.” Instead of building a house for someone that can’t afford it, can’t maintain it, and maybe, just maybe, liked how they were living in the first place, we ought to just help them clean and patch a little so they don’t run our property value down.
Posted by: Steve | 12/22/2009 at 11:01 AM